Mechanisms, Causes and the Layered Model of the World by Glennan, Stuart
   
Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the 
World*
Stuart Glennan 
Department of Philosophy & Religion 
Butler University 
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
 
Abstract 
Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain 
between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between 
properties of these individuals and events.  Such views fail to take into 
account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of 
individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those 
properties.  In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to 
provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties.  I do 
this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s 
functional model of reduction – and contrasting it with a mechanistic 
approach to higher-level properties and causation. 
                                                 
* This paper was originally delivered to a symposium on Mechanisms in the Sciences at the APA Central 
Division Meetings in Spring 2006.  I am grateful to the audience and to my cosymposiasts Peter Machamer, 
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 The distinction between an individual and its properties, a substance and its 
accidents, particulars and universals, or whatever you will call them, is very deeply 
entrenched in our philosophical worldview.  This is a consequence of our philosophical 
history – going back most prominently to Aristotle.  More broadly it is a consequence of 
the structure of our language and our logic.  The distinction between concept and object 
lies at the center of Frege’s semantics, where logic slides into metaphysics. 
The distinction between individuals and their properties plays a prominent role in 
the history of the debate over the nature of causal relations.  In Hume’s analysis for 
instance, causation is a relation between objects that are sorted by properties.  Most 
contemporary accounts of causation suppose that individuals and the events they 
participate in stand in causal relations in virtue of laws of nature, where laws of nature 
are characterized in terms of relations between properties or in terms of generalizations 
about individuals that are the bearers of properties. 
Notwithstanding its ancient pedigree and continuing influence, this ontological 
framework does not sit well with another pervasive ontological assumption – what we 
might broadly call the layered model of the world.  This view, which has its origins in 
ancient atomism and which blossomed into the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth 
century, holds that the entities which we see in the world are typically composed of 
smaller entities, with these entities being composed in turn of smaller entities, and so on 
until one reaches some bottom level of entities – the “atoms.”  This view moreover holds 
that the macro-world, including its entities, and their properties and causal relations, is in 
some sense dependent on and explicable in terms of the micro-world.  The layered model 
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does not mesh with the object/property/law ontology because that ontology is essentially 
flat and seems to suppose that what the objects, properties and laws are are the basic facts 
about the universe.  This disconnect becomes especially problematic when we seek to 
understand the nature of causal relations.  
My aim in this paper is to square the object/property/law ontology with the 
layered model by construing the layers that make up the world in terms of nested 
mechanisms, and in so doing to help to resolve concerns that higher-level causes are 
epiphenomenal.  I will argue that much of the literature on higher-level causation suffers 
from what I’ll call property bias – a tendency to think about the properties of objects as 
basic facts rather than mechanically explicable facts and a tendency to think about causal 
relationships as holding directly between properties rather than being mediated by 
particular mechanisms. 
My paper is in four parts.  In the first, I offer a simple analysis of the character of 
causal claims.  I  suggest that causal claims are of two kinds – claims about the objects 
and events that produce effects and claims about the properties of or facts about these 
objects and events that are relevant to these effects.  In the second part I contrast the 
traditional law-based approach to thinking about causally relevant properties with one in 
which laws and properties are explained by mechanisms, arguing that law-based accounts 
which fail to take seriously the layered model yield flawed accounts of causal relevance.  
In the third part I offer criticisms of one of the most serious attempts to integrate a 
property-based view of causal relations with the layered model – Jaegwon Kim’s 
functional model of reduction.  In the final part I spell out an alternative to the functional 
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model of reduction – one that avoids property bias and thereby provides a more 
satisfactory account of higher level causation. 
I. Productivity and Relevance 
 No account of the relation of higher to lower level causes will get very far without 
some preliminary decisions on what kind of things causes should be taken to be.  Is 
causation a relation between objects, events, tropes, aspects, variables, or facts?  And 
what, by the way, are each of these things?  That account must, moreover, suggest 
something about the relationship between singular or token causal claims, and causal 
claims about types.  It is not possible here to enter into an extended discussion about the 
nature of the causal relation and its relata, so I will accept what I take to be the most 
commonly held view – that causation is in the first instance a relation between events, 
and that events are understood in terms of instances or occurrences or exemplifications of 
properties.1
 What I do offer here is a proposal for a canonical form of a causal claim.  While I 
make no argument for universality, a wide variety of causal claims can be represented in 
this form.  The particular virtue of this form is that it brings to light an important 
distinction between two sorts of causes – causally productive events and causally relevant 
properties.  The form is as follows: 
                                                 
1  (Bennett 1988) provides a useful study of various theories about the semantics and metaphysics of 
events, and of the relation between events, facts and causes.  A briefer and more up-to-date discussion can 
be found in (Schaffer 2003).  While some metaphysicians would find my language here hopelessly sloppy, 
my major concern in characterizing events is to suggest that events have something to do with properties.  I 
will not worry here about the individuation of events, but I will assume that events must be more finely 
individuated than space-time locations and more coarsely individuated than facts.  If Bob coughs and itches 
at the same place and time, the coughing and the itching are different events, but if Bob coughs loudly, that 
is a fact about the coughing event, and not another event. 
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(C) Event c causes event e [in background conditions B] in virtue of properties P [of 
c, e or B].  
For example,  
Bob’s coughing (c) caused Carol to wake up (e) in virtue of cough’s loudness (P).   
We often speak of objects rather than events as causes – for instance if someone 
were to claim that the bomb caused Arnold’s death.  But this language is easily translated 
into event language, since, when one speaks of an object causing an event, it is generally 
the case that an event involving the object caused the subsequent event.  For instance, in 
this case, Arnold’s death was caused by the event of the bomb’s exploding. 
 Although the canonical form (C) singles out one cause of an effect, the set of 
events causally sufficient to bring about an effect are typically large, so that when we 
speak of the cause of an event, we are using pragmatic criteria to single out a certain 
event as especially salient.  When we say that the straw that broke the camel’s back 
caused the camel’s back to break, we know of course that the causal responsibility for the 
back-breaking was shared with whatever else was on the camel’s back. 
 The “in virtue of” clause of the canonical form highlights the importance of 
causally relevant properties to explaining why a cause produces an effect.   To illustrate 
the importance of the “in virtue of” clause, consider the claim that Bob’s coughing 
caused Carol’s waking in virtue of the cough’s loudness.  Bob’s coughing is an event, 
and that event produces Carol’s waking.  But if we know only this much, we are missing 
important information about the causes of Carol’s waking.  In particular, we don’t know 
what properties of Bob’s cough made Carol wake.  If we know that Carol woke because 
she heard Bob’s cough, then it was the loudness of the cough that mattered.  But other 
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things about the cough could have mattered.  For instance, Carol might have been woken 
by the cough because some nasty stuff landed on her shoulder. 
Causal relevance is essentially a counterfactual notion.  To say that the cough’s 
loudness was relevant to Carol’s waking is to say that if the loudness had been somewhat 
different, Carol wouldn’t have woken.  Similarly, to say that the amount of stuff coughed 
up wasn’t relevant is to say that even if the amount of stuff coughed up had been 
different, Carol still would have woken. 
In this example, we have considered only causally relevant properties of the 
productive event.  Relevance claims can, however, take a much wider variety of forms, 
and (C) is meant to allow some of this variety to be captured.  In the canonical form, we 
say that c causes in virtue of properties either of c, of e or of background conditions B.  
For instance, not only might we say that Carol’s waking is caused by the loudness of 
Bob’s cough, but also by the sensitivity of Carol’s ears.  Were Carol a bit deafer, she 
wouldn’t have been awoken by Bob’s coughing.   As an example of a case in which a 
causally productive relation between events holds in virtue of background conditions, 
consider the claim that the campfire caused the forest fire in virtue of the low humidity 
and high winds.  The low humidity and high winds are properties neither of the campfire 
nor the resulting forest fire, but they are features of the background conditions that are 
causally relevant, in the sense that, had they been different, then the campfire would not 
have produced the forest fire. 
In contrast to claims about causal relevant properties, claims about productive 
events are not essentially counterfactual.  To say that one event produced another is to 
say that in fact the causative event is connected to the effect via a continuous chain of 
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causal processes.  It matters not what might have happened had the productive event not 
occurred.  In cases of overdetermination, for instance, it might be the case that had the 
productive cause not occurred, the effect still would have occurred, but this lack of 
counterfactual dependence would not undermine the productive relation in the actual 
case. 
A further reason to think that productivity and relevance are distinctive notions is 
that it is possible to have knowledge of either kind of cause in the absence of the other.    
Suppose that we discover an outbreak of diarrhea and vomiting occurs within a 
population of people.  We may, using some variant of Mill’s methods, quickly surmise 
that the cause of the illness in each of these cases was the ingestion of food from a 
particular source.  At this point we have information about the productive cause of the 
illness.  We do not however understand which properties of the food led to the illness.  
Was it a strain of bacteria?  An inorganic contaminant?  
Conversely, in some cases we may know about properties that are causally 
relevant without knowledge of the particular productive events.  We have very good 
reason to believe that smoking is probabilistically relevant to lung cancer, and when a 
smoker gets lung cancer, we have good reason to believe that the smoking was relevant to 
her contracting cancer.  At the same time though, we cannot identify the particular events 
that got the cancer started.  Smoking is not a particular event, and we have no way of 
telling which cigarettes or even what quantity of cigarettes might have triggered the 
growth of a particular cancer.2
                                                 
2 While the particular way I have drawn the distinction between productivity and relevance is somewhat 
different from other accounts, both concepts have antecedents in the literature, as does the claim that there 
are two kinds of causes.  Various philosophers have argued for the centrality of productive continuity 
(Bogen 2004; Dowe 2000; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Salmon 1984).  Others have argued for 
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While these remarks are not sufficient to fully characterize the concepts of 
productivity and relevance, I hope that they at least suggest that we make two different 
kinds of causal claims.  In the following section, I shall try to spell out the concepts a bit 
more by comparing two accounts of how we should understand the relationship between 
causally relevant properties and productive events. 
II. Relevance, Laws and Mechanisms 
 The canonical form (C) characterizes causation a relation between events that 
obtains in virtue of certain properties of those events.3  Why the invocation of properties 
here?  The standard answer is that for one event to cause another event those events must 
fall under a causal law.  This is how Fodor puts it: 
Singular causal statements need to be covered by causal laws.  That means 
something like: 
Covering Principle: If an event e1 causes an event e2 then there are 
properties F, G such that (a) e1 instantiates F, (b) e2 instantiates G and (c) 
“F instantiations are sufficient for G instantiations” is a causal law.4
Fodor is hardly alone in thinking this.  He claims that this is the view of causation held by 
Davidson, but it is much more widely held than that.  There is much disagreement about 
what laws are, but little disagreement that laws underlie causal relations.  Even among 
those who advocate counterfactual theories of causation, it is widely assumed that there 
                                                                                                                                                 
the fundamentality of counterfactual notions of causal relevance (Hitchcock 1995; Lewis 1973; Woodward 
2003; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003).  Ned Hall (2004) has recently argued for the ineliminability of two 
concepts of cause.  In his essay he construes these as two sorts of causal relations between events, but much 
of his analysis of the difference between productivity and relevance carries over to this context.  
3 Or in virtue of certain facts about those events.  Facts are more finely grained than events, but are 
generally related to properties.  The fact that Bob coughed loudly is a fact about Bob’s coughing event. 
4  (Fodor 1989, 64).  Numbering of conditions has been changed. 
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are a set of laws of nature obtaining in this and other possible worlds, and that judgments 
about the nearness of a possible world to the actual world depend crucially upon these 
laws. 
 In my own work on mechanisms, I have suggested that what underlies most 
causal connections are not laws but mechanisms (Glennan 1996; 1997; 2002).  I have 
argued that most laws – indeed all causal laws except the basic laws of physics – are 
really just descriptions of the behavior of mechanisms.  I call such laws “mechanically 
explicable” for short.  Thus, for instance, Mendel’s laws are really just descriptions of 
various aspects of the mechanisms of sexual reproduction.  Such laws are true only 
ceteris paribus, and the ceteris paribus clauses are, roughly speaking, violated in just 
those cases where the mechanism breaks down.  For instance, Mendel’s law of 
independent assortment is true only for genes located either on different chromosomes or 
far enough away on the same chromosome that recombination breaks linkage. 
 This view of higher-level laws has become more common, especially 
amongst philosophers of biology and psychology.  Cummins puts it this way: 
Laws of psychology and geology are laws in situ, that is, laws that hold of 
a special kind of system because of its peculiar constitution and 
organization.  The special sciences do not yield general laws of nature, but 
rather laws governing the special sorts of systems that are the proper 
objects of study.  Laws in situ specify effects – regular behavioral patterns 
characteristic of a specific kind of mechanism (Cummins 2000, 121) 
Some philosophers do not wish to call these generalizations laws.  Woodward (2000) 
refers to them as invariant generalizations, while Craver (2007) has begun to call them 
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mechanistically fragile generalizations.  Schaffner (1993) sees these generalizations as 
parts of “theories of the middle range.”  But whether we choose to call them laws or 
something else, mechanists of all stripes agree that there are non-accidental, but not truly 
exceptionless generalizations that describe the behavior of mechanisms. 
 If this view of the relationship between laws and mechanisms is right, it suggests 
that Fodor’s covering principle is true but misleading.  It is true that wherever one event 
causes another, there will be a law appealing to properties of the events that says that the 
one event is ceteris paribus sufficient for the other5. The principle is misleading though 
because it suggests that the law is the truth maker for the causal claim.  In fact, the 
mechanism is doing the causal work, and the law simply summarizes the behavior of the 
mechanism. 
 Cummins usefully makes essentially the same point when he says that laws in 
psychology and other special sciences specify effects.  Since these laws in psychology 
and other special sciences describe the outward behavior of mechanisms, we don’t 
explain anything by identifying a law; we have instead identified a target explanandum.  
The description of the mechanism responsible for the production of this effect provides 
the explanation (cf. Glennan 2002). 
 If laws aren’t the truth makers for higher-level causal claims, then Fodor’s 
covering principle doesn’t really tell us what the role of properties is in making causal 
claims true.  The mechanist’s insight is that properties, and the nomological relations that 
hold between them, are not basic facts about the world, but are mechanically explicable 
                                                 
5 To a second approximation, not all singular causal claims can be seen to be instances of laws.   Laws are 
general, and there are sometimes singular causal claims involving essentially non-repeatable circumstances 
(say, e.g., claims about what caused Chamberlin to capitulate to Hitler at Munich) in which the events do 
not plausibly fall under general laws.  See Glennan 2002 for further discussion. 
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facts. 6  In particular, the mechanist claims that when, in accordance with the canonical 
form, c causes e in virtue of properties P, c produces e via the operation of a mechanism, 
and the causally relevant properties are properties of the mechanism, its parts and 
organization, and its background operating conditions. 
 To get this account right, we must clarify the relationships between properties, 
mechanisms and laws.  In particular, we must explore the consequences of the fact that a 
certain entity has certain properties is not a basic fact about that entity, but depends upon 
the nature and organization of that entity’s parts.  In the final two sections of this paper I 
will seek to spell this out by looking at two versions of the layered model.  I will begin 
with Kim’s functional model of reduction.  I shall show how Kim’s model involves a 
property bias which undermines his attempt to correctly characterize the relationship 
between properties at different layers.  In the final section, I will offer an alternative 
account of higher-level properties that I hope both provides a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between properties and the layered model and more adequately addresses 
worries about epiphenomenalism. 
III. Kim and Higher-Level Properties and Causation 
 Jaegwon Kim has written perhaps more extensively than any other philosopher on 
the causal and explanatory role of higher-level properties.  His principal concern has been 
the status of mental properties, but his model addresses the issue of higher-level 
properties generally.  For the sake of definiteness, I will focus on the account he gives in 
                                                 
6 Mechanists must come to terms with the fact that there appear to be some relations between fundamental 
constituents of the physical world whose causal relations are not mechanically explicable.  My claims here 
and throughout this paper are meant to apply to the non-fundamental case (which includes just about 
everything we talk about in causal terms).  For discussion about the relationship between fundamental and 
mechanical causes, see (Craver 2007, ch. 3; Glennan 1996; Glennan forthcoming; Psillos 2004) 
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his well-known Mind in the Physical World.7  While Kim stakes out an extensive and 
nuanced set of positions on higher-level property causation, we can get a grip on the core 
of his position by considering the following figure: 
 
Figure 1 
Suppose M and M* are mental or other higher-level properties, such that M 
causes M* to be instantiated.  For instance M might be the property of seeing a tiger, and 
M* might be the property of being afraid.  Minimal physicalism requires that mental 
properties supervene on physical properties, so let P and P* be the respective base 
properties for M and M*.  Because M* supervenes on P*, the only way for M* to occur is 
for   P to cause P*.  P and P* are we’ll presume neurological properties, and we have 
good reason to believe there is a complete story about how P causes P*.  But, since P* 
necessitates M*, there is no genuine causal role for M in necessitating M*.  Mental 
properties, because of their supervenience on physical properties, are epiphenomenal.  
This is what Kim calls the causal/explanatory exclusion argument, and it threatens mental 
and perhaps other higher-level properties with causal impotence (cf. Kim 38-47, 60-67).  
Kim argues that the only way out of this dilemma is reduction.  By reducing mental 
properties to physical properties, they regain their causal powers.  But in truth, it is not 
                                                 
7  (Kim 1998).  Unqualified page number references are all to this work. 
P*   P 
M M*
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clear that one has really saved the causal powers of the mental.  The reductionism Kim 
advocates skirts dangerously close to eliminativism. 
 One does not have to read a lot of his work to recognize that Kim conceptualizes 
reduction, supervenience and causation as relations between properties8  Supervenience 
is characterized as a relationship between families of properties, and individual events 
stand in causal relations to each other only insofar as they are subsumed under laws, 
where laws are understood to be “objective connections between properties” (Kim [1984] 
1993, 77). Mechanists should be suspicious of this flight from particulars.  If laws are in 
fact only descriptions of the behavior of mechanisms, then it is the mechanisms rather 
than the laws that are doing the work.  Similarly, when a higher-level entity has some 
property, there will be mechanisms that realize this property.  The mechanistic point of 
view suggests that the properties of things and the causal relations that obtain between 
those things depend on mechanisms, and mechanisms are not just abstract relations 
between properties, but concrete collections of organized interacting entities.  Failure to 
recognize this dependence on particulars is what I mean by property bias. 
 Kim thinks the only way out of the causal exclusion problem is to reduce higher-
level properties to physical properties.  To do this, he proposes what he calls the 
“functional model of reduction.”  The goal of this model is to show how an identity M=P 
holds between higher-level properties and physical properties.  If one can show that 
mental properties really are identical to physical properties then the causal exclusion 
problem doesn’t arise.  If, using the nomenclature of figure 1, M=P, then there is no 
puzzle about M and P both causing M* (=P*).  Here is how Kim describes his model: 
                                                 
8  See especially (Kim [1973] 1993) 
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To reduce a property M to a domain of base properties, we must first 
“prime” M for reduction by construing, or reconstruing, it relationally or 
extrinsically.  This turns M into a relational/extrinsic property.  For 
functional reduction we construe M as a second-order property defined by 
its causal role—that is, by a causal specification H describing its (typical) 
causes and effects.  So M is now the property of having a property with 
such-and-such causal potentials, and it turns out that property P is exactly 
the property that fits the causal specification (98).  
As examples of functional reductions, Kim cites temperature, transparency, and the 
property of being a gene.  In each case the higher-level properties are characterized in 
terms of their causal role.  Temperature, for instance is a magnitude that will flow (in the 
sense that objects with different magnitudes that are put in contact will tend to equalize).  
Transparent objects will allow light to pass through.  Genes will transmit characteristics 
between parents and offspring (cf. p. 25). 
 Kim’s treatment of the relationship between higher-level and functional properties 
and their realizers reveals property bias.  Kim’s view seems to be that higher-level (and 
higher-order) properties are fixed solely by the base properties and their 
causal/nomological relations.  He claims:   
Since whether or not P is a realizer of the functional property M is 
determined by the prevailing laws of nature, the realization relations 
remains invariant across all worlds with the same basic laws.  Thus M=P 
holds in all nomologically possible worlds…. This result seems right:  
given the prevailing laws, DNA-molecules are the carriers of genetic 
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information in this world, but in worlds with different basic laws, it may 
well be molecules of another kind that perform this causal work. (99-100). 
There’s something very wrong with saying that what can realize a functional property is 
entirely fixed by the “basic laws” of nature.  It is true, to follow Kim’s example, that were 
the basic laws of nature different, then DNA would not be able to function as a replicator, 
and hence as a realizer of the gene function.  But it certainly does not follow from this 
that DNA is the only possible realizer of the gene function within the actual world.  We 
know that RNA carries genetic information in some viruses.  But beyond this, it is likely 
that in a world with the same physical laws, there could be a wide variety of molecules 
and other mechanisms that could code and replicate information in the way that our 
DNA-based genes do.  Indeed, if we were to find life in distant parts of the universe we 
would be exceedingly surprised if the mechanisms of heredity in these life forms would 
closely resemble ours.  Close similarity would be evidence for common descent. 
 The root of Kim’s problem is his failure to recognize that the functional properties 
of complex entities depend not just on the basic laws of nature, but on the structure, 
organization and activities of the parts that make up these entities.  You can not explain 
functions without talking about mechanisms.  While Kim might not contest this point, 
offering a model of reduction in which realization is construed as a relation between 
disembodied properties shows a failure to recognize the metaphysical consequences of 
the particularity of mechanisms. 
 Let us return now to the functional model of reduction, and in particular to the 
question of whether it saves higher-level properties from causal impotence.  Logically, 
functional/relational characterizations of these properties can all be treated as second 
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order properties – having the property of being a property which does such and such.  But 
if this is the right way to think about functional properties, Kim thinks (following (Block 
1990)) that we should have serious doubts about the causal powers of functional and 
other second order properties.  To cite one of Kim’s examples, sleeping pills have the 
functional property of dormativity; that is, they have the property of being able to put 
people to sleep.  Seconal and Valium are two pills with the property of dormativity, but 
what causes one to fall asleep is not the pills’ dormativity, but the chemical properties of 
the pills that realize the dormativity.  More generally, this suggests what Kim calls the 
“causal inheritance principle” (54).  Any causal powers something has in virtue of its 
second- (or higher-) order properties are inherited from the first- (or lower-) order 
properties of that thing that realize those second (or higher-) order properties.  Ultimately, 
the fact that functional properties introduce no new causal powers suggests that 
functional properties are not really novel properties at all, but are simply second-order 
ways of designating first-order properties.  Dormativity is not a new property of sleeping 
pills over and above their chemical structures.  It is simply a functional designator of a 
class of chemical structures which can play the causal role of inducing sleep. 
 This line of reasoning seems plausible, but when one considers that Kim offers 
functionalization as a general model of reduction, its implications for higher-level powers 
is pretty scary.  Remember that Kim thinks that we can treat such properties as having a 
certain temperature and being a gene functionally, but if this is so, we appear to be 
robbing genes and even warm things of their causal powers!  It is only the structural and 
intrinsic properties that realize functions that have the genuine causal powers, but every 
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time we think we have an intrinsic property, we find that it in turn can be functionalized 
and reduced until we reach the fundamental physical level. 
 Do we even find instrinsic (as opposed to functional) properties at the physical 
level?  Maybe not.  If there were ever things that we would want to count as intrinsic 
properties, they would be basic properties of matter – like mass and charge.  But what is 
it to have a certain mass or charge?  The answer is given by basic laws of nature.  What is 
it to have a certain mass if it is not, e.g., to accelerate towards other massive bodies in 
accordance with the law of universal gravitation and Newton’s laws of motion?  Kim 
endorses a principle (119), which he attributes to Samuel Alexander, that says in effect 
that the only reason for attributing reality to some thing is that it has causal powers.  But 
to characterize a property in terms of its causal powers is to characterize it in terms of its 
second-order properties, and these properties don’t have causal powers.  Something is 
definitely wrong here. 
 Perhaps Kim has a solution to this dilemma.  That solution involves us making a 
distinction between higher-level and higher-order properties.  Higher-order properties are 
properties (or perhaps more properly property descriptions) obtained by quantifying over 
lower order properties.  Higher-level properties are properties belonging to aggregates 
that do not belong to their components.  Orders are a logical notion, while levels are 
mereological.  Kim suggests that there are no problems with attributing new causal 
powers to higher-level properties.  For instance, if a radio weighs 1 kg, that weight gives 
it certain causal powers-- e.g., the ability to stretch a spring by some distance k--  that 
would not belong to any of the radio’s parts.  Moreover, it will generally be the case that 
new causal powers are introduced not just by piling together parts but by organizing them 
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into mechanisms.   A radio has the power to receive a signal and convert it into a sound, 
but it only has this power in virtue of the functional organization of the parts.  A pile of 
radio parts is not a radio (cf. Craver 2007, ch. 5). 
 Kim thinks of these new causal powers as being attributed to what he calls micro-
based properties:  
P is a micro-based property just in case P is the property of being 
completely decomposable into non-overlapping proper parts a1, a2, … an 
such that P1(a1), P2(a2), … Pn(an), and R(a1, a2, … an) (84). 
Kim cites as an example of a micro-based property the property of being water.  Water 
molecules have three atomic parts that stand in a particular bonding relation to each 
other.  Kim emphasizes that micro-based properties are not functional properties but are 
the realizers of functional properties.  We can see for instance that the micro-based 
property of the radio is the structural property of the radio that realizes the functional 
property of being something that converts radio signals to audio signals. Kim’s account 
of these properties makes explicit that an entity x has such a property P in virtue of the 
kinds of parts of which it is composed and the relations that obtain between its parts.  
This goes some way towards correcting property bias and moving towards mechanisms  
 Although the notation is far from perspicuous, it might seem possible for Kim to 
pack enough information into the micro properties Pi and their relation R to provide an 
account of the organization of the mechanism responsible for the realization of R.  It does 
go some way, because it shows that the properties of things depend upon the micro-
structure of those things, but there is more to mechanism than structure.   
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The microstructure of a mechanism is what allows its parts to interact in order to 
produce the behavior of the thing, or as we would say in this instance, to realize its 
properties, but an account of how the mechanism works requires us to describe how 
things with that structure do in fact act and interact to produce the effect.  One of the 
functional properties of water, for instance, is that it is a solvent.  That water is a solvent 
depends upon its structure, but to describe the structure of water is not in itself to explain 
its solvent properties.  A proper description of the solvent properties of water involves 
explaining the mechanism by which water molecules interact with molecules of a 
dissolving substance like salt.  Note also that we can formulate laws to the effect that if x 
is a volume of water and y is a volume of salt, then, given appropriate volumes, the water 
will dissolve the salt.  But this law is, as Cummins says, an effect – a description of what 
happens that stands in need of explanation.  The effect is explained by describing the 
mechanism by which water molecules break the ionic bonds in salt. 
 Kim suggests to us that we should conceive of micro-based properties as higher-
level properties, because these are properties that can only be had by things which are 
themselves composed of proper parts.  These micro-based properties will in general have 
causal powers that none of their parts have on their own.  While I certainly would not 
deny that organized aggregates have novel causal powers, a micro-based property is not 
thereby a genuine higher-level property.  If we describe some thing x in terms of its 
micro-structure, the micro-based property P is taken to be identical to a complex 
conjunction of properties of and relations between its parts.  If having the property really 
amounts just to having that micro-structure, then this is a complex low-level property.  
Suppose for instance we have a micro-based property of the brain which serves as a 
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realizer of the functional property of being in pain.  Ultimately, via substitution, this 
property is going to be shown to be an exceedingly complicated structural description of 
the various neurological components of the brain which are involved in the realization of 
this function.  Kim would have us believe that this complex conjunction of properties of 
and relations between microscopic constituents of the brain is all we could mean by a 
higher-level property.  The problem with this account is that it makes the identity 
conditions for having a property depend upon the exact microstructure of the complex 
system.  But systems with distinct micro-based properties may instantiate the same 
higher-level property. 
To see this point more clearly, let’s consider a very simple example of the 
relationship between micro-properties and macro-properties.  Consider a specific shape 
property, the property of being a three inch cube.    Is this a micro-based property?  Well, 
if we consider any particular three inch cube, it would appear to be so.  The cube would 
be made of parts, perhaps small solid shapes, or perhaps the cube would be made of a 
uniform material, so that its constituents might be molecules in some lattice structure.  
For simplicity’s sake, imagine that we are building three inch cubes out of a block set 
made of 3”x 1”x 1” rectangular blocks.  There are, ignoring possibilities introduced by 
rotations, three ways to put these blocks into a three inch cube, as illustrated in figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Realizations of a three inch cube 
For any particular cube, we will be able to specify which blocks were used and how they 
were stacked together, and this will be a micro-based property in Kim’s sense, but the 
property of being a three inch cube cannot be identified with any particular one of these 
properties.  If we are to identify being a cube with a micro-based property, that property 
is going to be disjunctive.  But, says Kim and most other philosophers, disjunctive 
properties aren’t really properties at all (106-108).  Certainly they don’t have causal 
powers. 
 Kim’s attempt to characterize higher-level properties as micro-based properties 
thus appears to discount properties like shape as genuine structural properties, or at least 
to rob them of causal powers.  The most obvious way for Kim to respond to this problem 
is to stop treating shape as a structural property and functionalize it.  Shape ceases to be a 
higher-level structural property and becomes a higher-order functional property.  It is of 
course possible to characterize a property like shape in terms of causal dispositions.  For 
instance, we might say that two keys have the same shape if they can fit in the same 
locks.  But this is a desperate measure that I would not recommend.  If you must 
functionalize shape, it seems likely that you must functionalize all higher-level 
properties.  This move will rob higher-level properties of their causal powers, since 
causal powers belong according to Kim to the realizer. 
 The real difficulty with functionalizing all of these properties is that it will cause 
one to lose the scientifically invaluable distinction between structure and function.  To 
see the consequences of this move, let’s consider one further case in which two different 
shapes (structures) can realize the same function.  Dual-keyed locks are locks that can be 
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opened either by a standard key or a master key.  Thus, keys of either shape are realizers 
of the function of being a lock opener.  We certainly would not want to attribute to these 
keys the causal power to open locks in virtue of their properties of being lock openers, 
but we would want to attribute causal powers to the keys in virtue of their shape.  And 
when we have two copies of the standard key, it is in virtue of the same higher-level 
structural property (namely their identical shape) that they realize the functional property 
of being a door opener, but when we have a master key and a standard key, they realize 
the functional property in virtue of a different higher-level property.  An account of the 
relation between structural and functional properties which explains all realization 
relations in terms of micro-structure is going to miss the real causal powers of macro-
structural properties. 
IV. Mechanisms and higher level causes 
 In closing I would like to propose an alternative solution to the causal exclusion 
problem that appeals to the mechanistic approach to causation I’ve advocated, as well as 
to the distinction between productivity and relevance introduced in the first section of this 
paper.  Let us apply the canonical form of a causal claim to the case of a key opening a 
lock.  Instantiating (C) in this case we get: 
The turning of the key causes the opening of the lock in virtue of the shape 
and rigidity of the key that turned. 
The productive causal relation holds between one event—the key turning – and another 
event – the lock opening.  Equivalently we could say that the key – the object implicated 
in the key-turning event – produced the lock opening.  To say this is to say simply that 
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the key is a working part of the mechanism, and that key turning is one of its activities.  
What we should not say is that certain properties are productive.9   
Suppose key k opens the lock.  Let us say that it instantiates a certain 
microstructure M and a certain macrostructure (shape and rigidity) S.  The key k is thus 
an instance of both S and M.  If we think of productivity as a property of properties then 
we will mistakenly ask the question of whether it is S or M that produces the opening.  
But the very same key is an instance of both properties.  It is the key with microstructure 
M and macrostructure S that opens the lock.  To ask whether it was S or M that produced 
the opening involves a category mistake of attributing productivity to properties. 
When we wonder whether it is the microstructure or the macrostructure that 
matters, we are really asking a question about relevance.  Intuitively it should be clear 
that it is the macrostructure – the shape and rigidity – of the key that are the relevant 
properties, but let us consider what informs that intuition. 
Carl Craver (2007, ch. 6), in his attempt to defend the relevance of higher-level 
properties has suggested that we should understand relevance by appealing to the sorts of 
experimental manipulations we use to determine relevance.  Roughly, he suggests that we 
determine the relevance of a property by performing experiments to see what happens 
when we change that property.  This procedure will in fact ground our intuitions in this 
case.  We can demonstrate that shape and rigidity are the relevant higher-level properties 
by varying the shape and rigidity of keys which we put in the lock.  Keys with different 
shapes won’t unlock the lock, nor will keys made of non-rigid materials.  Equally we can 
                                                 
9 Jackson and Petit (1990) offer a somewhat similar solution to the one I’m proposing here, when they 
argue that higher level properties are causally relevant, while lower-level properties are the only ones that 
are causally efficacious.  Efficacy plays much the same role in their account as does productivity in mine.  
Their mistake in my view was to think of efficacy as a property of properties.  As I’ve argued earlier in this 
paper, it is only objects realizing properties rather than the properties themselves that can produce anything. 
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demonstrate that microstructural properties are irrelevant by showing how rigid keys of 
the same shape will all work to open the lock, despite substantial variations in, e.g., the 
materials of which the keys are made. 
Experiments of this sort are clearly crucial to our determinations of causal 
relevance, but I would not want us to suppose that these epistemic procedures are 
constitutive of causal relevance.  Experiments help us to understand the organization of 
the mechanisms that determine the causal relationships between events, but it is the 
organization and operation of the mechanisms themselves, not the experiments, that make 
certain properties causally relevant.  Consider again our lock and key.  Cylinder locks 
have a mechanism involving a number of parts – most notably a cylinder in a casing with 
a slot for the key, and a set of pins that fall down into the cylinder and can be pushed up 
into the casing by the key.  Key shape is causally relevant because it determines 
alignment of the pins, and proper alignment of the pins is what allows the cylinder to 
turn.  Anyone can establish that key shape is a relevant property, simply by doing 
experiments with different shaped keys.  But we do not understand why shape is relevant 
until we understand how the lock works.  By understanding the parts and organization of 
the mechanism we are able to explain and predict why certain keys will work and others 
will not.  
More generally, if we have a well-understood mechanism that is productive of 
some behavior or effect, that model will identify certain properties of the parts (or 
perhaps of collections of the parts) that determine how those parts interact.  These 
properties will figure in any generalizations we have concerning interactions of parts of 
the mechanism, so we will know that if these properties were to change, then the 
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behavior of the parts, and hence of the mechanism would change.  A description of the 
organization and operations of the mechanism will thus identify the relevant properties. 
Simple examples like the lock and key allow us to understand how the 
mechanistic model can be used to defend the reality and causal relevance of higher-level 
properties against the challenges posed by the exclusion argument.  Much of the real 
promise of the mechanistic approach, however, lies in explaining more complex causal 
processes.  The sorts of processes studied in the life and social sciences typically are 
hierarchical and involve mechanisms in which there is a complex causal interdependence 
between part and system level properties.  For instance, in the mechanism of human 
thermoregulation, changes in ambient temperature lead to changes in behaviors of 
thermoreceptor cells which in turn lead to changes in the hypothalamus, which in turn 
lead to both involuntary low-level responses like constriction of blood vessels and high-
level voluntary processes like putting on a sweater. 
In a recent paper, Craver and Bechtel have provided an analysis of how so-called 
top-down causation can be explained and demystified within a framework of hierarchical 
mechanistic analysis.  Their view is that supposed cases of top-down and bottom-up 
causation are not really cases of causation as such, but are what they call 
“mechanistically mediated effects.”  As they put it, “[these] effects are hybrids of 
constitutive and causal relations in a mechanism, where the constitutive relations are 
interlevel, and the causal relations are exclusively intralevel (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 
547).  The idea here is that higher-level systemic properties are not caused by the 
interactions of its parts, but are constituted by them.  Consider, for instance, a case in 
which ambient temperature drops, causing triggering of the body’s thermostat in the 
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hypothalamus.  This might look like a case of a property of the whole body (its ambient 
temperature) causes a change in one of its parts (signaling from the hypothalamus).  On 
closer analysis, however, what is going on at the neurological level is lots of local 
changes to the environment of individual thermoreceptor cells which, via some 
intracellular mechanism, trigger firings that collectively reach a threshold required to 
trigger negative feedback mechanisms controlled in the hypothalamus.  Change in the 
ambient temperature is not a high-level event over and above changes in the thermal 
energy in regions surrounding the thermoreceptor cells.  Changes in the ambient 
temperature don’t cause energetic changes in these regions; they are constituted by them. 
Craver and Bechtel’s analysis fits together nicely with the account I have offered 
of the distinction between productivity and relevance.  A change in ambient temperature 
is an event which has both microstructural and macrostructural properties.  For reasons I 
suggested in the lock and key case, it is a mistake to ask which of these properties 
produces changes in the hypothalamus.  My reasons are essentially the same as those 
offered by Craver and Bechtel.  Changes in microstructure and changes in macrostructure 
are not distinct events that might stand in productive causal relations.  But at the same 
time, we can save the intuition that causation is top-down, by noting that in a case like 
thermoregulation, it is changes in the high-level properties that are causally relevant.  As 
we’ve noted in this case, triggering of the negative feedback mechanism in the 
hypothalamus is a threshold effect that depends upon the overall volume of signals from 
thermoreceptors throughout the body.  Variations in which receptors are firing that do not 
change the overall signal volume will not change the system’s overall behavior.  For this 
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reason, the sorts of manipulations that will bring about triggering of the negative 
feedback mechanism will always involve changing a high-level property of the system. 
 
 What I’ve tried to suggest in this paper is that the philosopher’s traditional 
ontological categories of objects, properties and laws is simply not nuanced enough to 
explain the nature of causal relations in the layered world.  It is not that there aren’t 
objects, properties and laws in this world.  Of course there are.  It is just that these 
ontological categories are not basic, and when we treat them as such we get a distorted 
picture of the nature of causal relations.  One big payoff of the mechanistic approach is 
that it can tell us more about what objects, properties and laws really are.  In so doing, we 
get a much improved account of how the higher-level entities and properties that are so 
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